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This paper demonstrates the implications of adopting an approach to measuring poverty that 
takes into account the lifetime experience of individuals rather than simply taking a static or 
cross-sectional perspective. Our approach follows the theoretical innovations in Hoy and 
Zheng (2008) which address various aspects of the specific pattern of any poverty spells 
experienced by an individual as well as a possible retrospective consideration that an 
individual might have concerning his life experience as a whole. For an individual, our 
perspective of lifetime poverty is influenced by both the snapshot poverty of each period 
and the poverty level of the permanent lifetime consumption; it is also influenced by how 
poverty spells are distributed over the lifetime. Using PSID data for the US, we demonstrate 
empirically the power of alternative axioms concerning how lifetime poverty should be 
measured when making pairwise comparisons of individual lifetime profiles of consumption 
(income) experiences. We also demonstrate the importance of taking a lifetime view of 
poverty in comparing poverty between groups by use of the classic FGT ‘snapshot’ poverty 
index in conjunction with period weighting functions that explicitly reflect concerns about 
the pattern of poverty spells over individuals’ lifetimes. 
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 Empirical Issues in Lifetime Poverty Measurement
I. Introduction
It has long been recognized that the impact of poverty experienced by an in-
dividual for a long and sustained period of time is very di⁄erent than poverty ex-
perienced for one or more relatively short, intermittent, periods within a person￿ s
lifetime. These two temporal characterizations of poverty have come to be known as
chronic and transient poverty, respectively. Clark and Hume (2010) provide a very
useful background to the historical development of concern about, and progress with,
the conceptualization and measurement of individual poverty over time. They note
(Clark and Hume, 2010, p. 351) that ￿breakthroughs in terms of conceptualizing the
depth and breadth of poverty were not generally matched by equivalent, systematic
advances with regard to time prior to the late 1980s.￿ 1 However, even the terminology
of chronic poverty is long-standing. For example, Godley (1847, p. 2) describes his
concern with the persistent class di⁄erences between the ￿English Protestant aris-
tocracy and middle class, and the Irish Roman Catholic peasantry, ... (being) two
nations within Ireland.￿He describes the result of this social relationship (p. 10) as
creating ￿political and religious anomalies .... (that have) produced chronic anarchy,
with its necessary concomitant, chronic poverty.￿
As a result of increased availability of panel data, there has recently also been sig-
ni￿cant empirical research performed regarding the transitions of individuals into and
out of poverty and comparing duration of poverty for di⁄erent individuals within and
between countries or various population subgroups. Much of the focus of this research
has been on the identi￿cation of chronic and transient poverty and the measurement
of their relative importance. These approaches typically start by aggregating all
poverty spells of all individuals in order to obtain a measure of ￿total poverty.￿One
can then establish an estimate of each individual￿ s permanent income and use this
as the basis for determining the level of chronic poverty for each person in the pop-
ulation. The di⁄erence (residual) between total poverty and chronic poverty is then
frequently referred to as transient poverty. Methods for creating these types of dis-
tinctive measures can include a concern with intensity of poverty in both dimensions
of chronic and transient poverty by adopting an appropriate poverty index just as is
generally done in static poverty measurement exercises.2 Since policy prescriptions
that deal with these two types of poverty are likely to di⁄er, these exercises are both
useful and important.
Although important and insightful research on poverty dynamics of both a theo-
retical and empirical nature has been gaining in quantity and sophistication, devel-
opment of complete axiomatic characterizations for measuring poverty through time
1See also Addison, Hulme, and Kanbur (2008, p. 8) who note that ￿The introduction of time
into the economic theory of poverty measurement is relatively recent.￿
2Good examples of this approach are Jalan and Ravallion (1998, 2000), Ravalliaon (1998), Baulch
and Hoddinott (2000), and Duclos, Araar, and Giles (2010). See also the seminal paper of Rodgers
and Rodgers (1993).
31is an area of research in its infancy. The axiomatic foundations of static poverty
analysis has been well established for some time.3 Developing a complementary ap-
proach that incorporates sensitivity to the pattern of poverty spells through time can
borrow from that literature. However, there are many new challenges in developing
an axiomatic characterization that incorporates a temporal perspective. In order to
re￿ ect chronic poverty concerns, one must address the manner and extent to which
the clumping of poverty spells together or in ￿nearby periods￿should matter. The
permanent income approach, although useful empirically, does not distinguish, for
example, the di⁄erence between someone who experiences poverty in every second
period of her lifetime and someone who spends the ￿rst half of her life constantly in
poverty and the second half out of poverty. Both individuals could have the same
permanent income and hence be assigned the same measure of chronic poverty even
though one could well argue that the second person su⁄ered more chronic poverty
over her lifetime. Other questions that arise when considering how to measure chronic
poverty include the extent to which chronic poverty relief results from an interruption
of several consecutive periods of poverty with one or two periods of non-poverty.
Besides addressing the property of chronic poverty over a person￿ s lifetime, an-
other consideration that has been deemed important in comparing the temporal pat-
tern of poverty is that of the importance of poverty experienced early in life. There
is substantial empirical evidence that poverty in earlier stages of life not only a⁄ects
consumption in later periods but also leaves an inherently deeper mark on lifetime
deprivation. Recent research in neuroscience (e.g., see Farah, et al., 2006) suggests
that children growing up in poor families with low social status not only su⁄er from
inadequate nutrition and exposure to environmental toxins but also su⁄er from ele-
vated stress hormones that generally impair neural development, including e⁄ects on
language and memory.4 This suggests at least two channels for adverse e⁄ects on the
individual later in life. First is a direct lasting impact from poverty early in life in
that, due to the vulnerability of children, the physiological and psychological e⁄ects
noted above reduce their future enjoyment from life for any given future (continu-
ing) stream of consumption levels. Secondly, early poverty worsens an individual￿ s
capability to generate higher consumption later in life due to a compromised ability
to accumulate human capital and obtain favorable employment opportunities. This
second e⁄ect is captured implicitly if one includes all future levels of consumption in
the measurement of lifetime poverty. However, to account for the ￿rst (direct) e⁄ect,
one may require that any lifetime measure of poverty place greater weight on poverty
experienced earlier in life.
We believe that developing an axiomatic approach to measuring poverty in a way
that captures the subtle but important nature of the temporal pattern in which an
3See for example the surveys of Zheng (1997, 2000a).
4See also the reports on this line of research from the 2008 meetings of the American Association
for the Advancement of Science (Boston) described in an article by Clive Cookson (The Financial
Times, February 16, 2008) and also by Paul Krugman (New York Times, February 18, 2008).
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2individual experiences poverty during her lifetime can advance the way in which we
conceptualize and measure lifetime poverty. Examples of papers that take this ap-
proach and investigate the implications of precisely stated axioms relating to chronic
poverty include Calvo and Dercon (2007), Foster (2007), Bossert, Chakravarty, and
D￿ Ambrosio (2007), and Hoy and Zheng (2008).5 In the early stages of this research
program we believe it is important to (i) demonstrate the normative appeal of ax-
ioms adopted through use of simple hypothetical examples, (ii) illustrate the structure
imposed by axioms on the implied measurement approach, (iii) explain how di⁄er-
ent poverty measures imply di⁄erent e⁄ects from changes in the pattern of lifetime
poverty experiences, and (iv) demonstrate through examples the empirical value of
the measurement approach. In this paper we develop these themes for the approach
of Hoy and Zheng (2008). We review and expand on the normative implications of
the axioms adopted in their approach and provide empirical applications using the
PSID data set for the US.
In this paper we focus on the axioms from Hoy and Zheng (2008) that bring out
a concern with measuring lifetime poverty in a way that emphasizes the presence of
chronic poverty and poverty experienced early in life for an individual. In conjunction
with other axioms that re￿ ect standard concerns or properties of poverty from the lit-
erature on measurement of poverty in a static setting, one obtains a simple structure
for a lifetime poverty measurement approach. Speci￿cally, the axioms together imply
that lifetime poverty is measured as a weighted sum of all spells or ￿snapshot￿ex-
periences of poverty over the individual￿ s lifetime in conjunction with a retrospective
property of lifetime poverty based on average lifetime or permanent consumption.
We also show how pairs of individuals￿lifetime poverty experiences can be compared
on the basis of these axioms by use of relevant dominance conditions that are related
to the familiar ￿concentration dominances￿but based on vectors constructed from
the time pro￿les of consumptions of pairs of individuals.
We demonstrate our approach using PSID data for the US from which we are
able to create income pro￿les over twenty-six years for 1,494 individuals. Without
any structure on the weights, a pairwise lifetime poverty ordering requires vector
dominance of lifetime poverty pro￿les. We ￿nd that few pairwise comparisons are
unambiguous. The structure imposed by both the chronic and early poverty axioms
signi￿cantly extends the fraction of unambiguous pairwise comparisons that can be
made. Further, by adopting speci￿c poverty measures that are consistent with our
axioms, we show how the comparisons of poverty between subpopulations can be
in￿ uenced by a concern with the temporal pattern of poverty experiences. The implied
cost of poverty di⁄ers from that implied by an approach that simply averages each
person￿ s poverty experiences over time.
In Section II we lay out the structure of our lifetime poverty measurement ap-
5See also Cruces (2005), Grab and Grimm (2007) and Carter and Ikegami (2007). Bossert,
D￿ Ambrosio, and Peragine (2008) and Hoy and Zheng (2008) are, to our knowledge, the only papers
that provide a complete axiomatic characterization of lifetime poverty measurement.
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3proach, explain its normative features, and demonstrate how to implement it. Section
III provides an elaboration of the important temporal aspects of chronic and early
poverty e⁄ects. Empirical applications are explored and reported on in Section IV,
followed by a section with remarks and conclusions.
II. The Measurement of Individual Lifetime Poverty
In this section we explain the properties of the lifetime poverty measure used
in our empirical analysis. This lifetime poverty approach is developed formally in
Hoy and Zheng (2008).6 The measurement for individual lifetime poverty consists of
three steps: (1) the measurement of each individual￿ s ￿snapshot poverty￿at each time
period in life, (2) the aggregation of these snapshot poverty spells across all periods,
and (3) the inclusion of a retrospective view of poverty over the lifetime as a whole.
Here a period is interpreted as the basic unit of time that poverty is measured;
income is collected at the beginning of each period to enable consumption in that
period and in the subsequent periods.7 A person is poor in a period if and only if
his consumption level in that period falls short of the poverty line. The measurement
of snapshot poverty at each period is straightforward; each individual￿ s poverty is
measured as his consumption deprivation from the poverty line. The conventional
literature on poverty measurement provides ample guidelines for this stage of the
measurement.
It is the second stage of lifetime poverty measurement that expands the literature
on poverty measurement. When viewed from a lifetime perspective, the su⁄ering and
deprivation of an individual in each period transmits into the lifetime evaluation of
poverty. All other things equal, the more deprivation a person endures in a given pe-
riod, the more lifetime poverty is created for or experienced by the individual. This
￿experience axiom￿is akin to the monotonicity axiom or the subgroup consistency
axiom typically used in the measurement of snapshot poverty for a single period of
time. All these snapshot poverty experiences considered in isolation of each other,
however, may not su¢ ce to determine lifetime poverty. One should also account for
periods in which an individual lives out of poverty. Over a lifetime an individual,
in retrospect, may well bene￿t from high consumption experienced in non-poverty
spells. Given that the deprivation in one period can be o⁄set at least in part by
the experience of a› uent living in another period, lifetime poverty is also in￿ uenced
by consumption over one￿ s lifetime as a whole when it is compared with a sort of
￿lifetime poverty line.￿The essence of this argument is re￿ ected in our ￿retrospective
axiom￿which stipulates that lifetime poverty is a function of the lifetime permanent
6The axiomatic characterization, as well as proofs, are provided in Hoy and Zheng (2008).
7Consumption is generally thought to be a better measure of the standard of living than is
income. However, in many data sets, as in our￿ s, information on consumption is not available. We
do not try to distinguish between income and consumption in this paper, although we recognize the
importance of doing so.
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4consumption poverty (in this paper permanent consumption is approximated by the
average lifetime consumption in the absence of discounting). This re￿ ects a sense
of how an individual has experienced lifetime poverty from a retrospective view of
her consumption pro￿le or a sense of poverty over the lifetime considered as a whole.
The particular pattern or timing of poverty spells also may a⁄ect the overall lifetime
poverty of an individual. We explore these further axioms on the timing of poverty
spells (see below), along with other regularity assumptions, to derive a general class
of lifetime poverty indices that are the weighted sum between the (weighted) av-
erage snapshot poverty level across all periods and the poverty of average lifetime
consumption.
Consider an individual who lives through T periods. Each period can be inter-
preted as a year or as a phase of life such as youth, middle age and old age. In each
period t, t = 1;2;:::;T, the individual has a non-negative level of consumption xt. In
each period, the individual￿ s poverty status is determined by comparing his consump-
tion level with the poverty line 0 < z < 1 which is exogenously given and remains
constant throughout the T periods. The individual is poor in period t if and only if his
consumption level xt is strictly less than z. Denote x = (x1;x2;:::;xT)0 the pro￿le of
the individual￿ s lifetime consumptions, his lifetime poverty level is a function P(x;z)
which maps each consumption pro￿le x into [0;1). The average consumption of the
individual over the T periods is ￿ x. For each consumption variable, we also de￿ne its
censored consumption as ~ xt = minfxt;zg.
At the beginning of each period, the individual collects income and allocates it to
the consumption of that period and the periods to come; at the end of each period, the
individual compares his consumption level xt with the poverty line z. If xt < z, he has
poverty deprivation which is measured by p(xt;z): p(xt;z) > 0 if xt < z; otherwise
he lives out of poverty: p(xt;z) = 0 if xt ￿ z. We refer to p(xt;z) as the ￿snapshot
poverty￿of period t. The measurement of poverty deprivation has been well studied in
the literature. In general, we assume that p(xt;z) is continuous,
@p(xt;z)
@xt < 0 (denoted
as p0 < 0 hereafter) and also in some cases we also impose
@2p(xt;z)
@x2
t > 0 (denoted
p00 > 0 hereafter) for all xt 2 [0;z).8 That is, poverty deprivation decreases as
consumption increases (p0 < 0); it is often presumed to decrease, however, at a slower
pace as consumption increases (p00 > 0) ￿in part this is to re￿ ect the poverty aversion
consideration (Zheng, 2000). Although higher-order conditions can be entertained,
in this paper we limit our investigation to only the ￿rst two orders.9 Accordingly,
8Other axioms in the literature such as the increasing poverty line axiom ￿p(xt;z) is increasing
in z ￿and the unit-consistency axiom (Zheng, 2007) ￿which implies that p(xt;z) is a homogeneous
function of xt and z - may also be considered to further specify the functional form of p(xt;z).
9Our choice also re￿ ects the fact that poverty orderings at third and above orders may collapse to
second-order if the poverty line is uncertain and expands over a large interval (Zheng, 1999). With
uncertain poverty lines, the consideration of higher-than-second-order conditions may introduce little
additional insights on poverty orderings. Shorrocks and Foster (1987) and Davies and Hoy (1994,
1995) explore the implications of third-order stochastic dominance in making inequality comparisons.
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5we also assume the lifetime poverty measure P(x;z) to exhibit similar properties as
p(x;z), i.e.,
@P(x;z)
@xt ￿ 0 and possibly
@2P(x;z)
@x2
t ￿ 0 for all xt 2 [0;1). Note that here
we require only weak inequalities and the range for xt is over [0;1) rather than [0;z).
This is because, unlike in the measurement of snapshot poverty where any change in
xt above z has no e⁄ect on the poverty level, here such a change may or may not
a⁄ect the lifetime poverty ￿as we will see below.
In Hoy and Zheng (2008) it is shown that the axioms we impose imply a spe-
ci￿c functional form of P(x;z); namely one that is additive in the snapshot poverty
experiences from each period, p(xt;z), as well as the amount of poverty from a retro-
spective view, measured by p(x;z), where x is average lifetime income. The resulting







+ [1 ￿ ￿(T)]p(￿ x;z): (1)
The weights ￿(t;T) applied to each poverty spell have mathematical properties
that re￿ ect the axioms relating to the way in which we account for our emphasis on
chronic and early aspects of the pattern of lifetime poverty experiences. The early
poverty axiom implies that ￿(t;T) is falling in t while the chronic poverty axiom
implies that ￿(t;T) is concave in t. The weight ￿(T) 2 [0;1] re￿ ects how much
emphasis is placed on these individual spells of poverty incurred by an individual
while the residual weight, [1 ￿ ￿(T)], is placed on the overall lifetime (permanent)
consumption ￿ x of the individual, where p(￿ x;z) > 0 if ￿ x < z and p(￿ x;z) = 0 if ￿ x ￿ z.
This implied structure allows for a straightforward approach to generating lifetime
poverty indices. One can simply choose any of the standard static poverty measures
for p(xt;z) and p(￿ x;z), such as the classic FGT measures, which embody important
properties of static poverty measurement. This structure also allows for the creation of
dominance conditions to test for potential unambiguous poverty companions between
pairs of lifetime income pro￿les. We use empirical examples to demonstrate the
usefulness of both of these results in Section IV. Here we elaborate on the axioms
that give rise to this structure for lifetime poverty measurement and then provide
implementation results.
In an ideal empirical application one can imagine the subscript t representing
the age in years (or set of years such as early childhood, middle childhood, teenage
years, young adulthood, etc.) and using data to follow a cohort of individuals born
(approximately) at the same time and living the same number of years T.10 Our
approach, however, could also be used to study some subset of individuals￿lifetimes,
say the young childhood years up to age 12 (t = 1;2;:::;12) or the teenage/young
adult years (t = 1 to 11, where t = 1 refers to age 13 and t = 11 refers to age 23).
However, real world data provides challenges to empirical applications of lifetime
10One important issue that we do not address is the complication associated with individuals
living di⁄erent lengthed lives. For important work on this topic, see Kanbur and Mukherjee (2007).
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6poverty measurement. Panel data often covers only ￿ve to ten years of lifetimes and
it isn￿ t clear how accurate a picture of lifetime experiences one obtains from such
a limited stretch of time. Also, most panel data sets don￿ t have su¢ cient numbers
to allow for tracking and comparison of speci￿c cohorts. We are able to extract
26 consecutive years of income experience using PSID data and follow a mixture of
cohorts based on the entire sample. We also identify subgroups based on ethnicity
and region. For our regional analysis, we also split the sample into two equal length
periods of 13 years to address the question of how representative a limited stretch
of time may be as an approximation to lifetime experience. We address these issues,
and others, later in the paper.
In equation (1) it is clear that any poverty experienced in a given period t con-
tributes to lifetime poverty through the ￿snapshot poverty￿index p(xt;z). But the
individual￿ s picture of lifetime living is not entirely dictated by the poverty spells
that he has experienced in the various periods. He might view that ￿even though I
experienced some poverty spells at various points in time, life as a whole has been
very good to me since I had an a› uent living later in my life.￿This means that the
individual registers all poverty deprivations but we also allow periods of rich living
in the rest of his lifetime to o⁄set some of the bad experiences or memories. In other
words, consider a person who has experienced some periods of poverty in his lifetime
while in other periods had consumption levels ￿just su¢ cient￿to be considered non-
poor. Another individual who experienced the same number and pattern of spells
of poverty, but who also enjoyed periods of relatively high consumption when not in
poverty, would from a whole lifetime or retrospective manner presumably feel he has
experienced less poverty than the ￿rst person. Should we treat such individuals di⁄er-
ently in measuring their lifetime poverty? A natural and manageable way to consider
poverty for the entire lifetime in a retrospective manner is to model consumption
over the lifetime as if it were completely smoothed out. The poverty level is then
computed by comparing lifetime (permanent) consumption with the lifetime (perma-
nent) poverty line. Since we assume the poverty line remains the same throughout
all T periods, all consumption levels will be in real terms and will not be discounted
either (or consider they are already discounted). Therefore, we proxy permanent con-
sumption with a simple average consumption over the lifetime.11 Noting that p(￿ x;z)
is the poverty of lifetime average consumption, our second axiom summarizes the
afore-discussed in￿ uence of lifetime smoothed consumption on lifetime poverty. We
refer to this aspect as a retrospective property or view of poverty over the individual￿ s
lifetime taken as whole.
With the retrospective property, the standard focus axiom in the literature (i.e.,
that any change made in any above-the-poverty-line consumption has no a⁄ect on the
poverty level) needs to be modi￿ed. Since now a change in a consumption may a⁄ect
11If a more suitable representation of permanent consumption is deemed necessary, we can replace
￿ x with such a permanent-consumption function ￿(x1;x2;:::xT) in the rest of the paper. All results
involving ￿ x will also hold with some appropriate modi￿cations.
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7lifetime poverty through two routes: through the snapshot poverty in each period and
through the poverty of average-lifetime-consumption. It follows that the new focus
axiom should be reformulated as: a change in a period￿ s consumption has no e⁄ect
on lifetime poverty if and only if both the consumption level in that period and the
average-consumption level of the entire lifetime are above the poverty line. This is to
say: (i) if xt < z then
@P(x;z)
@xt < 0, (ii) if ￿ x < z then
@P(x;z)
@xt < 0;8t (since raising any
xt will raise ￿ x and hence lower P(x;z)), while (iii) if xt ￿ z , 8t, then
@P(x;z)
@xt = 0.
These results are all clear in equation (1).
But this leaves us with the question of how the combination of snapshot poverty
spells may interact with each other to jointly determine lifetime poverty. In order
to maintain the simple additive form of P(x;z) in equation (1), we assume that
the impact of each period￿ s snapshot poverty p(xt;z) on lifetime poverty P(x;z) is
independent of the level of any other period￿ s snapshot poverty p(xs;z) for s 6= t
and of the poverty level of the average lifetime consumption p(￿ x;z).12 This property
is akin to the decomposability axiom used in the snapshot poverty measurement;
it enables researchers to compute the contribution of each year￿ s consumption and
the smoothed consumption to total poverty and allows policy-makers to identify the
speci￿c factors that are responsible for changes in the overall poverty value. This
requirement amounts to saying that there is no interaction among the poverty levels
of the various periods and that of the average consumption. More formally, this
property can be stated as
@2P(x;z)
@p(xt;z)@p(xs;z) = 0 for all s 6= t and
@2P(x;z)
@p(xt;z)@p(￿ x;z) = 0 for all
t = 1;2;:::;T.
The property of independence does not rule out the possibility of interesting tem-
poral relationships between spells of poverty. In fact, it is the salience of the tem-
poral pattern of snapshot poverty experiences that we believe lies at the heart of
the di⁄erence between measuring poverty at a given point in time and an individ-
ual￿ s lifetime poverty. In our approach this is established through the properties of
the weighting function ￿(t;T) as will become evident below. However, before ad-
dressing those properties of the poverty measure P(x;z), we note two technical or
normalization assumptions that we make. First, we assume that P(x;z) = p(x;z) if
x = x1 = x2 = ::: = xT. Secondly, without loss of generality, we choose the weights
￿(t;T) and ￿(T) such that 0 < ￿(t;T) < 1, 0 < ￿(T) < 1 and
PT
t=1 ￿(t;T) = 1.
The result is that we can use a straightforward additive functional form to provide
a useful characterization of how poverty over the lifetime can be conceptualized as
a weighted average of snapshot poverty levels and a level of poverty associated with
average lifetime consumption.
Consider the balance between that part of lifetime poverty that depends on the
weighted sum of snapshot poverty levels,
PT
t=1 ￿(t;T)p(xt;z), and that part that
12Note, however, that we later introduce an axiom (chronic poverty axiom) that allows for the
￿closeness￿in time of any two poverty spells to in￿ uence the lifetime poverty measure. So in terms
of the timing of poverty spells there will be a relationship between any pair xs < z and xt < z to
lifetime poverty.
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8depends on permanent consumption level, p(￿ x;z). The coe¢ cient ￿(T) plays the role
of balancing between these two aspects (i.e., the weighted average ￿snapshot poverty￿
and the average-lifetime-consumption or retrospective poverty). A larger value of
￿(T) means that the individual is concerned more about the poverty incidences he
has experienced on a period by period basis and less about when his life as a whole
is evaluated. In the limiting case of ￿(T) = 1, the individual gives no consideration
to the average or smoothed lifetime consumption; the individual￿ s lifetime poverty
in this case is determined exclusively by the poverty deprivations he has had in his
life no matter how a› uent he may be when life as a whole is judged. On the other
hand, ￿(T) = 0 means that the individual cares about only the lifetime aggregate or
average consumption and the poverty deprivation in any period matters not at all in
the evaluation of lifetime poverty. In this sense, we may label ￿(T) as a ￿memory
parameter￿￿￿(T) = 1 is the polar case of ￿perfect memory￿and ￿(T) = 0 is the
other polar case of ￿no memory,￿respectively.13 To compute the individual￿ s lifetime
poverty index using (1) ￿which will be used in the rest of the paper, the memory
parameter must be speci￿ed. If all possible values of ￿(T) are considered, then we
have
Result 1: For two lifetime consumption pro￿les x and y, P(x;z) ￿ P(y;z) for any






￿(t;T)p(yt;z) and p(￿ x;z) ￿ p(￿ y;z): (2)
This result can be regarded as our ￿rst dominance condition. The result is reason-
able and intuitive. To characterize further the lifetime poverty index and establish
additional dominance conditions, we need to take a closer look at the weighting func-
tion ￿(t;T). Suppose the researcher wishes to remain entirely agnostic about how to
place relative importance of poverty spells experienced at di⁄erent points in time in
an individual￿ s life. Then this will mean that to say lifetime poverty for one pro￿le of
consumption values x is unambiguously higher than for some other pro￿le y it must
follow that the conclusion (equation (1)) must hold for any set of weights ￿(t;T). For
this most general perspective, then, we have:
Result 2. For two lifetime consumption pro￿les x and y, P(x;z) > P(y;z) for all
￿(T) 2 [0;1] and all possible values of ￿(t;T)s if and only if
~ xt ￿ ~ yt and minf￿ x;zg ￿ minf￿ y;zg (3)
for t = 1;2;:::;T and the strict inequality holds at least once, where ~ xt = minfxt;zg.
13By ￿perfect memory￿we mean that the individual (or ethical observer) takes into account ￿and
only takes into account ￿all the details involved with the pattern of lifetime consumptions while
by ￿no memory￿only the average lifetime consumption is used as a su¢ cient statistic to evaluate
lifetime poverty.
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9Condition (3) states that for pro￿le x to have more lifetime poverty than y un-
ambiguously (i.e., for all possible weights), it must be the case that the consumption
in each period of x, if it is below the poverty line, is no greater than that in y (i.e.,
vector dominance is required). Moreover, it has also to be the case that the average
lifetime consumption, if it is below the poverty line, is no greater in x than that in y.
By contrast, suppose one considers that all periods of poverty experiences are
equally important; i.e., ￿(s;T) = ￿(t;T) for all s and t. This corresponds to treating
lifetime poverty as the simple arithmetic average of all spells of poverty. This leads to
a rather simplistic and strong view of lifetime poverty in that it ignores any possible
importance of the pattern of poverty spells such as a concern with early or chronic
poverty experiences. The following result can be easily veri￿ed using standard results
from the literature of majorization.
Result 3. For two lifetime consumption pro￿les x and y, if the ￿(t;T)s are the same,





t=1 p(yt;z) and minf￿ x;zg ￿ minf￿ y;zg for a given depriva-
tion function p; or
(b) also for all deprivation functions p such that p
0 < 0, vector (~ x1;:::; ~ xT) is rank
dominated by vector (~ y1;:::; ~ yT) and minf￿ x;zg ￿ minf￿ y;zg; or
(c) also for all deprivation functions p such that p
0 < 0 and p
00 > 0, vector
(~ x1;:::; ~ xT) is generalized Lorenz dominated by vector (~ y1;:::; ~ yT) and minf￿ x;zg ￿
minf￿ y;zg.
There is an advantage in empirical implementations of this strict and simplistic
view as it ties down the set of weight function that one can use. That is, in comparison
to Result 2, the implications of requiring weights ￿(t;T) to be equal for all t rather
than allowing for any set of weights leads to a larger fraction of cases that can be
ranked as demonstrated in the section presenting our empirical results.
One can think of the assumptions made in Results 2 and 3 as extreme cases of
weakness and strength regarding permissible patterns of the weight functions ￿(t;T)
for comparing the importance of the timing of poverty in terms of its impact on
lifetime poverty. There is clearly a dramatic loss of power in making pairwise rankings
by moving from the strongest to weakest set of restrictions. In what follows we
consider intermediate positions which we argue re￿ ect received concerns about relative
timing of poverty in an individual￿ s life. As noted in the introduction, it seems that
there is a consensus that early stages of life such as childhood matter more than
later-life periods in shaping the individual￿ s lifetime well-being/poverty. Translated
in terms of the weighting function ￿(t;T), this notion can be formally stated as an
axiom.
The early-poverty axiom. The weighting function ￿(t;T) is nonincreasing in time
t.
Note that what the early-poverty axiom states is di⁄erent from the discounting
concern that is usually imposed on aggregation over time, although the discounting
12
10weight function ￿(t;T) = ￿t with 0 < ￿ < 1 does happen to satisfy the axiom. Here
we do not discount over time per se; our concern is purely about the size of impact
of each period￿ s poverty deprivation on the aggregate lifetime poverty.14 With this
additional requirement, we have
Result 4. For two lifetime consumption pro￿les x and y, P(x;z) ￿ P(y;z) for all






t=1 p(yt;z) for l = 1;2;:::;T and minf￿ x;zg ￿ minf￿ y;zg for
a given deprivation function p; or
(b) also for all deprivation functions p such that p
0 < 0, vector (~ x1;:::; ~ xl) is rank
dominated by vector (~ y1;:::; ~ yl) for l = 1;2;:::;T and minf￿ x;zg ￿ minf￿ y;zg; or
(c) also for all deprivation functions p such that p
0 < 0 and p
00 > 0, vector
(~ x1;:::; ~ xl) is generalized Lorenz dominated by vector (~ y1;:::; ~ yl) for l = 1;2;:::;T and
minf￿ x;zg ￿ minf￿ y;zg.






~ yt for l = 1;2;:::;T (4)
which is the concentration curve dominance between (censored) lifetime consumption
pro￿les of x and y. Concentration curve dominance is constructed similarly to the
generalized Lorenz curve dominance with the exception that the values of fxtg and
fytg are not sorted before the construction. The concentration curve dominance
condition can be handily used to screen out consumption pro￿les in (lifetime) poverty
orderings.
Finally, we introduce the axiom that characterizes the chronic aspect of lifetime
poverty. Suppose an individual has to endure two poverty spells within certain periods
of time. Chronic poverty is generally de￿ned as living in poverty continuously for an
extended period of time. In terms of our general setup, experiencing two consecutive
periods of poverty would have a greater (negative) impact on an individual￿ s life than
if these two spells were separated by a period in which poverty was not experienced.
We generalize this notion by suggesting that any two spells of poverty, say even if
separated by one or more periods of non-poverty, would have less impact if separated
by more periods of non-poverty. This idea is formalized below.
The chronic-poverty axiom. For a given consumption a < z that occurs in two
spells, the closer the two spells together, the greater is the resulting lifetime poverty,
i.e.,
￿(s;T)p(a;z) + ￿(u;T)p(a;z) ￿ ￿(r;T)p(a;z) + ￿(v;T)p(a;z) (5)
for all 1 ￿ r < s ￿ u < v ￿ T such that s ￿ r = v ￿ u.
14In fact, as we will see later, the usual discount-weighting scheme is ruled out when the further
axiom re￿ ecting a concern with chronic poverty is introduced.
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11Notice that the chronic-poverty axiom speci￿es that two equivalent spells of
poverty occurring in periods (s;u) have greater impact than if the same spells had
occurred in periods spread out symmetrically by k > 0 periods in both directions;
i.e., in periods (r;v) = (s￿k;u+k). So, for example, spreading out equivalent spells
of poverty in periods (s;u) = (17;19) to periods (r;v) = (16;20) implies a reduction
in lifetime poverty due to ￿added relief￿from the chronic poverty that arises from
only one period of prosperity separating the poverty spells compared to three peri-
ods of separation. Note that there appears to be an implicit con￿ ict with the early
poverty axiom in that the movement of a spell of poverty from period 17 to period 16
implies an increase in concern from earlier poverty being experienced. However, this
is countered by the pushing apart of the two spells of poverty as the second spell is
delayed from period 19 to 20. Without the implicit symmetry requirement, pushing
the time period of poverty experienced in period 17 to the ￿rst period of life (e.g.,
choosing (r;v) = (1;20)) would imply that the earlier poverty e⁄ect from experienc-
ing the spell in period s = 17 to occur 16 periods earlier in life (r = 1) is countered
by the pushing of poverty from period u = 19 just one period later (v = 20).15
The chronic-poverty axiom (including the requirement of s￿r = v￿u) implies that
the weighting function ￿(t;T) is concave in t.16 To see this simply divide equation
(5) by p(a;z) and rearrange to obtain
￿(s ￿ k;T) ￿ ￿(s;T) ￿ ￿(u;T) ￿ ￿(u + k;T); u ￿ s (6)
which is satis￿ed if and only if ￿(t;T) is concave in t. This implies:
0 < ￿(1;T) ￿ ￿(2;T) ￿ ::: ￿ ￿(T ￿ 1;T) ￿ ￿(T;T) ￿ ￿(T;T) (7)
Examples of satisfactory poverty indices are ￿(t;T) = (1￿ t
T+1)￿ with 0 < ￿ < 1 and
￿(t;T) = c0 ￿c1t￿c2(t￿1)2, c0;c1;c2 ￿ 0 (with c0 = c1T +c2(T ￿1)2 +1 to ensure
￿t > 0 for all t). The discount-rate coe¢ cient ￿(t;T) = ￿t with 0 < ￿ < 1 does not
satisfy the chronic poverty axiom since it is convex in t.
Result 5. For two lifetime consumption pro￿les x and y, P(x;z) ￿ P(y;z) for all
￿(T) 2 [0;1] and all possible values of ￿(t;T)s satisfying the early-poverty axiom and










m)p(yT￿l+m+1;z) for l = 1;2;:::;T and minf￿ x;zg ￿ minf￿ y;zg for a given deprivation
function p; or
(b) also for all deprivation functions p such that p
0 < 0, vector
~ xl = (~ x1;::; ~ x1;:::; ~ xT￿l+1;::; ~ xT￿l+1; ~ xT￿l;::; ~ xT￿l; ~ xT￿l;::; ~ xT￿l;:::; ~ xT)
15This issue is considered more formally in Hoy and Zheng (2008) where it is shown that absence
of a symmetry requirment or some other similar restriction leads to the result that the early poverty
axiom becomes impotent.
16Recall that the early poverty axiom implies that the weights ￿(t;T) are non-increasing in t.
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12is rank dominated by a similarly de￿ned vector ~ yl for l = 1;2;:::;T and minf￿ x;zg ￿
minf￿ y;zg; or
(c) also for all deprivation functions p such that p
0 < 0 and p
00 > 0, vector ~ xl
is generalized Lorenz dominated by vector ~ yl for l = 1;2;:::;T and minf￿ x;zg ￿
minf￿ y;zg.
Note that a dominance between ~ xl and ~ yl does not imply nor is implied by the
dominance between (~ x1;::; ~ xT) and (~ y1;::; ~ yT) because none of the vectors is ordered (if
they are increasingly ordered then the two types of dominance would be equivalent).
To see this, consider x = (3;1) and y = (2;4) with z = 5. Clearly x is rank
ordered by y but ~ x2 = (3;3;1) is not rank ordered by ~ y2 = (2;2;4). The method for
implementing results 5 (b) and (c) are explained in the appendix.
III Elaboration of Early and Chronic Poverty Concerns
In this section we elaborate through use of examples of alternative weighting
functions, ￿(t;T), the way in which one can incorporate a concern with chronic
and early poverty in a lifetime poverty measure. As noted in the discussion above,
one needs to be careful in considering how the two axioms re￿ ecting chronic and
early poverty concerns interact. In order to bring out these issues as clearly as
possible, throughout we assume zero weight placed on poverty related to average
lifetime consumption (i.e., p(x;z)) and so [1￿B(T)] = 0: This allows us to focus only
on that part of the lifetime poverty measure that aggregates the snapshot poverty
experiences. Incorporating the term involving p(x;z)) is straightforward.
Our chronic poverty axiom implies that the weighting function ￿(t;T) must be
concave in t. Moreover, since any pair of weights generated by two di⁄erent weighting
functions are normalized by dividing each ￿t by the sum of weights in order to have
the normalized weights sum to unity, any measure of concavity of ￿(t;T) should
be preserved by any positive linear transformation. Thus, it is natural to compare
the properties of this function to those of the von Neumann-Morgenstern elementary
utility index used in risk theory; i.e., u(x), and its standard measure of curvature or
degree of concavity RA(x) = ￿
u00(x)
u0(x) (i.e., the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk
aversion). In the case of our lifetime poverty measure, however, income appears in
the snapshot poverty measure (p(xt;z)) while it is a spread in the time dimension,
something we will call a ￿temporal spread￿ , that is the relevant exercise in our case
rather than a mean-preserving spread of incomes as used in analyzing risk theory.
Thus, there isn￿ t a direct analogy between the cost of poverty and the cost of risk
(risk premium). Nonetheless, a similar measure of curvature or concavity of ￿(t;T)
is apporpriate. Thus, we use CA(t) =
￿00(t;T)
￿0(t;T) as a measure of concavity or curvature
of the weighting function.17
17Since ￿(t;T) has both negative ￿rst and second derivatives, we omit the negative sign in our
measure of curvature. Also, in poverty measurement concavity of ￿(t;T) means a temporal spread
reduces lifetime poverty, which is a ￿good thing￿ .
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13Due to the requirement that weights be normalized in order to sum to unity, it
is not possible to move from one weighting function to another which has a greater
or lesser degree of curvature without also having an e⁄ect on the extent to which
the lifetime poverty measure is sensitive to early poverty. This is easily seen by
considering the family of weighting functions ￿(t;T) = (1 ￿ t
T+1)￿ with 0 < ￿ < 1








￿￿1. In the case
of ￿ = 0 the normalized weights are equal (￿t = 1=T) and so the lifetime poverty
measure would be completely insensitive to the temporal pattern of snapshot poverty
experiences (i.e., to either early or chronic poverty concerns). In the case of ￿ = 1,
the weighting function will be linear and decreasing and so the associated lifetime
poverty measure would be sensitive to early poverty but not chronic poverty. As one
reduces the value of ￿ from 1 to 0, the degree of curvature of the weights increases
but there is also a change in the sensitivity of the implied lifetime poverty measure to
early poverty. As seen in the ￿gure below, a lower value of ￿ implies less concern with
early poverty (i.e., with lower ￿ the normalized weights become ￿less steep in t￿along
with having a higher degree of curvature). As an example, the funtions ￿1(t), ￿2(t)
in Figure 1 below are generated from ￿(t;T) = (1￿ t
T+1)￿ for the weights ￿ = 0:2;0:5
respectively, T = 4.
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Figure 1: Weights for ￿(t;T) = (1 ￿ t
T+1)￿
with ￿ = 0:2 (i.e., ￿1(t)) and ￿ = 0:5 (i.e., ￿2(t))
If one used only linear, decreasing weights that sum to unity, one could simply
use the absolute value of the ￿rst derivative to measure the sensitivity of the implied
lifetime poverty measure to early poverty concerns. However, once one accepts the
possibility of weights that are nonlinear in time, as one must to re￿ ect sensitivity to
chronic poverty, one cannot create a simple global measure re￿ ecting the degree of
sensitivity to early poverty. However, a crude re￿ ection of concern to early poverty
over the entire range of t = 1;2;:::;T is the overall di⁄erence in weights from beginning
to end; i.e., ￿(1;T)￿￿(T;T). We will call this the (overall) drop in weights and use
it as our measure of sensitivity to early poverty conditions. It is clear that for the
above example, this value is less for the set of weights that has a higher degree of
curvature. However, one can also choose a family of weights that allow for a movement
in the direction of a lifetime poverty measure that becomes more sensitive to early
poverty through parameter changes that imply either a higher or a lower degree of
curvature. A simple example of such a family of weighting functions is the quadratic
function mentioned earlier (i.e., ￿(t;T) = c0 ￿ c1t ￿ c2(t ￿ 1)2, c0;c1;c2 ￿ 0, and
c0 = c1T + c2(T ￿ 1)2 + 1 to ensure ￿t > 0 for all t).
The measure of curvature for this weighting function is CA(t) =
2c2
c1+2c2(t￿1). This
function is strictly concave for c2 > 0 and the measure of curvature is increasing
in c2 and decreasing in c1. For the non-normalized weights, ￿(1;T) = c0 ￿ c1 and
￿(T;T) = 1 and so the di⁄erence ￿(1;T)￿￿(T;T) = c1(T ￿1)+c2(T ￿1). Thus, the
overall drop in the set of non-normalized weights is increasing in both c1 and c2. The
anchor for any set of non-normalized weights is ￿(T;T) = 1. Thus, increasing either
c1 or c2 will also increase the drop in the set of normalized weights. Increasing c1 when
c2 = 0 leads to a greater sensitivity to early poverty concerns while retaining linearity
of the weighting function and hence no sensitivity to chronic poverty. Suppose instead
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15that one begins with an initial value of c2 > 0. In this case one can create a set of
weights with more sensitivity to early poverty by increasing the parameter c1 (c2) and
in doing so one obtains a set of weights with a lower (higher) degree of curvature.
In developing explanatory examples and empirical illustrations it is useful to have
a method of reporting lifetime poverty that allows for intuitive comparisons. In this
regard we follow Duclos, et al. (2010) in de￿ning a money metric cost of poverty as the
￿equally-distributed equivalent￿(EDE) poverty gap; that is, the level of poverty gap
if distributed equally to all persons in all periods of life that would produce the same
measure of poverty as for the actual lifetime pro￿les of poverty experienced across the
population. Naturally the EDE poverty gap will depend on both the properties of the
snapshot poverty index, p(xt;z) and the weights a(t;T). We investigate these e⁄ects
by ￿rst considering the weighting function ￿(t;T) = (1 ￿ t
T+1)￿ with 0 < ￿ < 1









decreasing in ￿. Thus, in comparing any pair of such functions, the one with the
smaller value of ￿ has a higher degree of concavity.18 Besides changing the way in
which chronic poverty contributes to an overall poverty measure, we also show how
di⁄erent values of ￿ imply di⁄erent costs of poverty arising from earlier versus later
poverty experiences. As shown above, in general it is not possible to perfectly isolate
these di⁄erent implications.
Consider the weight function values for ￿ = 0:5 and 0:2, with the latter having
the higher degree of concavity as measured by CA(t) and also less sensitivity in
early poverty as measured by the drop ￿(1;T) ￿ ￿(T;T). As always the weights
are normalized by dividing by the sum
T P
t=1
￿(t;T) to create a sum of 1 for the ￿nal
weights. We use the FGT poverty index p(xt;z) = (1 ￿ xt=z)", with " = 1 unless
otherwise stated. The poverty line is always z = 5.
Consider the income vector x = (5;1;1;5). Upon spreading the two poverty spells
by k = 1 period in each direction we obtain y = (1;5;5;1). Using ￿t for ￿(t;T), we
obtain the following sets of weights for ￿ = 0:5; 0:2:
￿ = 0:5: ￿1 = 0:325; ￿2 = 0:282; ￿3 = 0:230; ￿4 = 0:163 (8)
￿ = 0:2: e ￿1 = 0:280; e ￿2 = 0:264; e ￿3 = 0:244; e ￿4 = 0:212 (9)
Both sets of weights come from a ￿concave function￿and so spreading out the two
periods of poverty in a manner described by the chronic poverty axiom will lead to an
increase in poverty. This can be illustrated by the results that, for ￿ = 0:5, P(x;z) =
0:40952 > P(y;z) = 0:39048 and for ￿ = 0:2, P(x;z) = 0:40636 > P(y;z) = 0:39364.
We now explain how the ￿equally-distributed equivalent￿(EDE) poverty gap can
be interpreted as a cost of lifetime poverty and how to associate various aspects of
18It is clear that the weight function with the smaller value of ￿ can be written as a strictly
concave function of the other.
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16the temporal pattern of spells on the ￿overall￿cost of poverty.19 Let gx represent
the vector of poverty gaps associated with the income vector (pro￿le) x. For the
above example gx = (0;4;4;0) and gy = (4;0;0;4). Let gx be the vector formed by
inserting the average poverty gap in each period, and so gx = gy = (2;2;2;2). We
use the same symbol, but not in bold (i.e., gx) to refer to the average value of this
poverty gap (i.e., gx = 2 for the above example). The EDE is the equivalent constant
poverty gap for a consumption pro￿le is that (single valued) poverty gap which, if
incurred in each period of life, would generate the same poverty level as that for some
existing lifetime pro￿le of poverty spells. Let this value be represented by b gx. Clearly,
this value will depend both on the properties of the snapshot poverty function p(xt;z)
and the choice of weighting function. In the context of our above choices, we write
this as a function of the relevant parameters of these functions; that is, b gx(￿;"). The
extent to which this value di⁄ers from the average poverty gap re￿ ects several aspects
of the cost of poverty, including the intensity of poverty across poverty experiences
(as measured by p(xt;z)) and the temporal pattern (i.e., early and chronic poverty
properties).
To isolate that aspect due to the temporal pattern of spells, we select " = 1 and
begin by selecting the equal weights case (￿t = 1
T, 8t = 1;2;:::;T) which eliminates
chronic poverty and early poverty considerations. We then introduce a weighting
scheme with sensitivity to timing of poverty spells. In terms of our weighting function
above this would correspond to initial selection of ￿ = 0 to re￿ ect equal weights.
For the poverty gap measure, i.e., the FGT measure with " = 1, in conjunction
with ￿ = 0, we obtain b gx(0;1) = b gy(0;1) = gx = gy = 2. Taking into account
the temporal aspects through choice of ￿ = 0:5 we obtain b gx(0:5;1) = 2:048 and
b gy(0:5;1) = 1:952. Compared to equal weighting across time periods, the cost of
poverty in pro￿le x rises while that for y falls. This highlights an important point.
In comparison to equal weighting, introducing a concern for time sensitivity can of
course lead to a reduction in the measured value of lifetime poverty. Thus, accounting
for the temporal aspect of poverty can lead either to an increase or decrease in poverty
compared to an approach that weights periods equally. In conjunction with the use
of " = 1 for the FGT measure, which is neutral in regards to intensity of poverty, note
that equal weighting across time periods implies vectors of poverty gaps (0;4;4;0),
(4;0;0;4), and (2;2;2;2) all generate the same measure of lifetime poverty. But once
we introduce a concern with chronic poverty - and early poverty - by using a weighting
function that is both decreasing and concave in t - the cost of poverty rises above 2 for
the distribution with more chronic poverty and falls below 2 for the distribution with
poverty spells (more) spread out over time. In one sense pro￿le y = (1;5;5;1) may
seem worse than (2;2;2;2) in that it has an earlier spell of poverty which is deeper,
but it also has less poverty in the middle periods of life - with some poverty ￿pushed￿
19We follow quite closely the approach developed in Duclos, et al. (2010), which in turn ins based
on the idea of the cost of inequality measurement in Kolm (1969) and Atkinsons (1970). However,
we take a very di⁄erent approach in how we take into account chronic poverty measurement.
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17to a later period. Moreover, the two spells of poverty in y are separated by two time
periods while for (2;2;2;2) poverty is experienced in any pair of successive years and
so no relief from consecutive poverty experiences occurs. Thus, it is not unrealistic
to assign a lower value of poverty to pro￿le (1;5;5;1) than to (2;2;2;2), especially
given the presumption that intensity of spells in a snapshot sense is irrelevant (i.e.,
through use of " = 1 for the FGT measure).
Similarly, using ￿ = 0:2, implying a greater measure of concavity of weights, the
cost of poverty for pro￿les x and y become b gx(0:5;1) = 2:032 and b gy(0:5;1) = 1:968.
Note that although there is more chronic poverty present in pro￿le x than in y, the
increased cost of poverty associated with the temporal pattern in x compared to that
for y is less when the weighting function displays a greater degree of concavity (i.e.,
for ￿ = 0:2 compared to than ￿ = 0:5). The reason is that the importance of early
poverty is also di⁄erent for the di⁄erent values of ￿ and it is not really possible to
separate these two in￿ uences. Overall, one can see that, despite the simplicity of the
example above, comparisons are indeed rather complicated. We would argue that
in fact this should be the case.20 It is not and should not generally be possible to
separate in a simplistic manner concerns with early poverty, chronic poverty, and
di⁄erent intensities of poverty across di⁄erent time periods. Spreading out poverty
spells to earlier and later periods in life create less chronic poverty but also di⁄erent
patterns of early/late poverty experiences. Despite the complications, however, one
can obtain some insights into actual lifetime poverty comparisons between individuals
and groups by taking care to use alternative weighting functions and alternative
snapshot poverty measures to ￿tease out￿di⁄erent properties of lifetime poverty and
comparisons between groups.
This can be seen by comparing two income pro￿les with one identical spell of
poverty but in one case, x, the spell occurs in the ￿rst period of life, with gx =
(4;0;0;0), while for the other, y, it appears in the last period of life, with gy =
(0;0;0;4). The average poverty gap in each case is gx = gy = 1. Under equal
weighting (and " = 1) we of course obtain b gx(0;1) = b gy(0;1) = gx = gy = 1.
Taking into account the temporal aspects through choice of ￿ = 0:5, we obtain
b gx(0:5;1) = 1:30 and b gy(0:5;1) = 0:65. Compared to equal weighting, the cost of
inequality in pro￿le x rises by 0:3 while that for y falls by 0:35 due to the earlier
versus later experience of poverty. Using ￿ = 0:2, the cost of inequality in pro￿le x
rises by only 0:12 while that for y falls by only 0:15. Thus, although the smaller value
of ￿ implies a greater measure of concavity of weights, it also clearly has an impact
on the cost of inequality due to an earlier versus later spell of poverty. This can be
seen by comparing the overall drop in the weights, which for ￿ = 0:5 is ￿1 ￿ ￿4 =
20If one begins with a concave weighting function and wants to obtain a ￿more concave￿function
through a concave transformation of the ￿rst function, then the resulting two functions will not
generally have the same range ￿(1;T) ￿ ￿(T;T) and certainly can￿ t have the same ￿rst derivative
throughout domain t ￿ [1;T] which re￿ ects the relative sensitivity of the lifetime measure to an
earlier poverty concern at each point in time t.
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180:325 ￿ 0:163 = 0:162 while for ￿ = 0:2 we have e ￿1 ￿ e ￿4 = 0:0:280 ￿ 0:212 = 0:068.
Again, we repeat that these two aspects of chronic and early poverty cannot be easily
disentangled and nor should they. However, we can apply weighting functions such
as from the quadratic family (￿(t;T) = c0 ￿c1t￿c2(t￿1)2) to do robustness checks
when comparing the implications of accounting for temporal patterns on lifetime
poverty for individuals or for group comparisons. The following example shows the
importance of doing so.
Comparing the above two weighting functions, based on the family ￿(t;T) =
(1 ￿ t
T+1)￿ with ￿ = 0:2 and 0:5, we can see, roughly speaking, that the weighting
function that has a higher degree of curvature also has less sensitivity to early poverty.
As shown earlier, one can easily generate weighting functions for which this is not
the case. Consider the two weighting functions based on the family ￿(t;T) = c0 ￿
c1t ￿ c2(t ￿ 1)2:
￿(t;T) = 14 ￿ t ￿ 0:5(t ￿ 1)
2 (10)
e ￿(t;T) = 14 ￿ t ￿ (t ￿ 1)
2 (11)
The function e ￿(t;T) has the greater degree of curvature for all t 2 [1;4] and a
greater overall drop with e ￿1 ￿ e ￿4 = 0:406 ￿ 0:031 = 0:375 compared to ￿1 ￿ ￿4 =
0:333 ￿ 0:141 = 0:192. Thus, e ￿(t;T) displays both more sensitivity to chronic and
early poverty. Using these weighting functions, we ￿nd for the above case that for
gx = (0;4;4;0) and gy = (4;0;0;4), and " = 1 for the FGT snapshot poverty index,
that using ￿(t;T) above we obtain b gx = 1:333 and b gy = 0:564 while using e ￿(t;T)
above we obtain b gx = 1:625 and b gy = 0:125. Thus, contrary to the comparison
using ￿(t;T) = (1 ￿ t
T+1)￿, the cost of poverty for distribution x, which displays
more chronic poverty, is greater when the more concave weighting function is applied,
while that for y is less. The cost of early poverty is also greater for weighting function
e ￿(t;T) than for ￿(t;T) from equations (10) and (11).
IV. Empirical Results
The data we use is taken from the PSID.21 We use information only on those
individuals who were in the ￿rst year of the panel (1968) and for whom we have
continued data throughout to year 1993 (T=26 consecutive years, with reports being
for 1967 to 1993, and a total of 1,494 individuals). Although some data is sporadically
available for later years, we do not use it as we require an unbroken sequence of time
periods. Unfortunately, information on consumption is not available so we use income
as a proxy. In each year we know the family size of the unit in which the individual
lived and we use this information to generate a sequence of 26 consecutive years of
income information for each individual. We need comparable incomes across time
that take into account changes in the CPI and family size. We also need a consistent
21This data set is publicly available (see http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/).
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19poverty line (threshold) for the entire period. We accomplish this by ￿rst converting
all incomes into real (CPI-adjusted) values, using 1983 as our base year.
The poverty thresholds for various family sizes were obtained from the U.S. Census
Bureau. These are reported in 1983 constant dollars and vary slightly from year
to year since they are not based on the all-goods CPI. This variation, however, is
small. For a single person household this poverty threshold varies from a minium of
$4,993.57 to a maximum of $5,070.87 in 1983 dollars over the 1967-1992. To achieve
a single poverty line that does not vary by year and is the same for average lifetime
income we take the average of the values over the 26 years which is $5,047.69. Also
for the purpose of consistency, we choose equivalence scales based on the ratio of the
poverty line used in the PSID for each family size relative to an individual in a single
household. For example, since the poverty line for a 2-person family is 6483.79, the
equivalence scale for a two-person family is 6483.79/5047.69 = 1.28. The full set of
poverty lines is reported in Table A1 in the appendix.
Using time consistent values as described above leads to almost identical annual
poverty rates as from the use of year-speci￿c poverty lines used in the PSID. The
average annual poverty rate for our subset of individuals is 6.87% while lifetime
poverty (based on average lifetime income) is 3.28%.22
Pairwise Comparisons
The fraction of those in the population who are never poor (i.e., in any year)
is 59.6%. We are interested in seeing how di⁄erent criteria (axioms) used to assess
lifetime poverty, including those axioms that highlight the importance of chronic and
early poverty, lead to di⁄erent conclusions regarding how many pairs of individuals
can be ordered in regard to their lifetime poverty status. Therefore, although we
realize our data is not representative of the US population23 this is not particularly
worrisome since it is only the relative power of the axioms that interest us and this
is simply a demonstration of that. In this analysis we ￿rst concern ourselves only
with comparisons based on general classes of poverty indices (i.e., for all deprivation
functions p such that p
0 < 0 or p
0 < 0 and p
00 > 0).
Since 59.6% of the sample never experience poverty, a large fraction of possible
pairwise comparisons are of no interest (i.e., those in which neither individual in such
pairs ever experienced poverty or if one person experienced no poverty in any given
period while the other did). Thus, there are 603 individuals of interest to attempt to
compare lifetime poverty, leading to C2
603 = 181;503 pairwise comparisons.
We ￿rst focus on the possibility of making general pairwise comparisons; that is,
when can one say that person A su⁄ers more or less lifetime poverty than person
22That is, based on average lifetime equivalized income, 3.28% of the individuals in our sample
had average income over the 26 years of recorded income below the poverty line of $5,047.69 in
constant 1983 dollars.
23Perhaps the most important reason our sample is not representative is that we only choose indi-
viduals who have lived throughout the 33 year period and were traced and agreed to be interviewed
in each of those years.
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20B for given (standard) restrictions on the snapshot poverty index, p(xt;z), as well
as the retrospective poverty index p(x;z), and ￿new￿restrictions on the weighting
function ￿(t;T).24 We consider two usual possibilities for the properties of p(xt;z)
and p(x;z); namely, p0 < 0 for xt < z - the notion that poverty deprivation decreases
as consumption increases - and p00 > 0 - the notion that poverty deprivation decreases
at a lower rate as consumption increases. If one considers only one period in which
to make pairwise poverty comparisons, then such comparisons are straightforward.
However, in comparing lifetime pro￿les of consumption of two persons, it is not so
clear what additional restrictions, if any, to place on the lifetime poverty measure.
The most general perspective would presumably be to say person A is more poor
than person B if, for every period of life t = 1;2;:::;T, person A incurs at least as
much poverty as person B and strictly more poverty in at least one period. Not
surprisingly, adopting such a general perspective does not allow for much power in
making pairwise comparisons since the comparison of lifetime poverty must hold for
every possible set of non-negative weights ￿(t;T). We ￿nd that among those persons
who experience at least one spell of poverty, only 11% of pairwise comparisons are
ranked (Result 2).
At the other extreme (Results 3 (b) and (c)), suppose we consider weighting
all poverty spells equally regardless of the stage of life in which a poverty spell is
experienced or how close poverty spells occur within one￿ s lifetime. This would be
equivalent to using weights ￿(t;T) = 1=T for all t, while allowing for any value
￿(T) 2 [0;1]. Such a strong assumption does indeed improve the power of the poverty
ordering induced by P(x;z) with 64% ranked when only p0 < 0 is assumed and 77%
ranked when p00 > 0 is also assumed. Although this is a very signi￿cant improvement
in the ranking ability of the lifetime poverty measure, the assumption of equal weights
is rather like ignoring any possible importance in the timing of poverty spells. On
the other hand, if one adopts the rather weak requirement of the early poverty axiom
(Results 4(b) and (c)); that is, that weights ￿(t;T) be nonincreasing in t, then we are
able to rank 38% when only p0 < 0 is assumed and 43% when p00 > 0 is also assumed.
The ordering power improves further to 49% and 66% of cases, respectively, when
one also adopts the chronic poverty axiom (Results 5 (b) and (c)) which restricts the
set of weight functions ￿(t;T) to be nonincreasing and concave.
Our results above suggest that moving to a lifetime poverty measurement approach
in which one needs to compare many time periods of possible poverty experiences
between individuals rather than simply a single period, cross-sectional application,
may reduce one￿ s ability to say when one person has (unambiguously) experienced
more lifetime poverty than another. However, adoption of rather general and, we
believe, normatively pleasing axioms about how the temporal pattern of poverty spells
a⁄ects a person￿ s lifetime poverty experience as a whole, improves the possibility of
ranking individuals who have experienced at least one spell of poverty in terms of their
24We explain in the appendix how to make these comparisons using the various dominance criteria
associated with each set of requirements.
23
21overall lifetime poverty. Making pairwise rankings within populations may seem of
secondary importance to overall population comparisons. However, when considering
a policy change which may a⁄ect transitory poverty experiences as well as have a
speci￿c temporal e⁄ect in terms of alleviation of chronic and/or early poverty, it may
be very useful to be able to make pairwise comparisons for each individual before and
after a (possibly hypothetical) policy change. Doing so may allow one to estimate
what fraction of individuals will experience more or less lifetime poverty as a result
of such a policy for a broad range of lifetime poverty measures in much the same
spirit as stochastic dominance has allowed researchers a way to determine when one
distribution of income generates more or less inequality or welfare than another for a
wide class of relevant measures rather than one speci￿c one.25
Group Comparisons
We now move on to a set of applications involving comparisons of lifetime poverty
between groups or subpopulations. Our data allow us to identify ethnic groups
￿white￿ and ￿non-white￿ . Since it is well established from cross-sectional studies
that there is more poverty among non-whites than whites, it is interesting here to
determine whether recognizing temporal aspects of poverty in a lifetime poverty mea-
surement exercise changes the extent to which these sub-groups experience poverty.
In terms of numbers of individuals who experience some poverty in their lifetime, the
percentage for whites is 27.4% while that for non-whites is 70.7%. The cumulative
frequency for those who do experience at least one spell of poverty is provided in the
appendix (Figure A1). We see that, amongst those who experience some poverty,
88% of non-whites experience more than one spell of poverty while only 65.5% of
whites experience multiple periods of poverty. Moreover, among those experiencing
any poverty, the percentage incurring ￿ve or more spells of poverty is 28.6% for whites
and 63% for non-whites Thus, one would expect much more potential for chronic
poverty to have a large in￿ uence on the lifetime poverty measure for non-whites.
However, if multiple spells are su¢ ciently spread out over time then departing from
equal (or linear) weights to a concave set of weights will not necessarily in￿ ate the
lifetime poverty measure for non-whites more than it does for whites. The extent to
which poverty spells are experienced early in life, in addition to the extent to which
they are ￿clumped together￿will of course also have a bearing on how accounting for
the temporal pattern of poverty experiences impacts the lifetime poverty measure for
non-whites compared to whites.
We begin our formal analysis of these issues with weights based on the function
￿(t;T) = (1 ￿ t
T+1)￿ , 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, and explore how changing the parameter ￿ a⁄ects
the cost of poverty for the two groups as re￿ ected by the EDE poverty gap. We
present results using the FGT family of poverty measures for our snapshot poverty
index, p(xt;z) = (1 ￿ xt=z)", for both cases of " = 1 ,2. Note that when choosing
25For example, see Shorrocks and Foster (1987), Davies and Hoy (1994, 1995) for general appli-
cations of stochastic dominance and Davies and Hoy (2002) for a speci￿c policy example involving
hypothetical changes to income tax schedules.
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22￿ = 0 we are adopting equal weights ￿t = 1=T. At the other extreme, ￿ = 1 implies a
concern with early poverty but no concern with chronic poverty. Moving from ￿ = 1
to ￿ = 0 represents a move to a more concave weighting function but also to one with
a lesser degree of emphasis on early poverty. Results are summarized in the following
two tables.
Table 1: EDE poverty gap







Table 2: EDE poverty gap







In the case of " = 1 (Table 1), we see that as ￿ rises, the cost of aggregate lifetime
poverty for whites falls by over 10% while that for non-whites rises by about 3%.
In particular, by comparing the case of ￿ = 0 (equal weights) to ￿ = 1 (decreasing
weights in t) we can focus on the implications of a sensitivity to early poverty since in
neither case is the weighting function strictly concave. With no temporal sensitivity
in measuring lifetime poverty (￿ = 0) the ratio of the cost of poverty of non-whites to
whites is 437:27=92:17 = 4:74 while introducing a concern for early poverty this ratio
becomes 452:03=82:38 = 5:49. Thus, the relative cost of lifetime poverty between
non-whites and whites is sensitive to how one accounts for temporal properties of the
timing of poverty spells, and in particular a concern with early poverty.
Considering the case of " = 2 (Table 2) allows us to investigate the implication of
accounting for the intensity of poverty experiences across poverty spells. This has a
greater e⁄ect on the measurement of poverty for whites, with an increase in measured
cost of poverty of a factor of approximately 5 (for each value of ￿) than for non-whites,
with an increase in the cost of poverty of a factor of approximately 2.3. The direction
of the e⁄ect of changes in ￿ on the cost of poverty for whites and non-whites is similar
to the case of " = 1, although the magnitude of the e⁄ect on the cost of poverty for
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23non-whites is substantially reduced. This demonstrates that one must be aware of
possible interactions of assumptions about the temporal properties of lifetime poverty
as well as about the importance of the intensity of poverty re￿ ected in the snapshot
index.
Roughly speaking, using the weighting function ￿(t;T) = (1￿ t
T+1)￿ and snapshot
poverty index p(xt;z) = (1 ￿ xt=z)" suggest that measures of the cost of lifetime
poverty for whites is relatively more sensitive to the assumption about the intensity
of poverty than for non-whites. Lifetime poverty measurement for whites falls as one
increases concern with early poverty experiences while it rises for non-whites. As
mentioned earlier, one cannot necessarily disentangle how changing a parameter in a
weighting function a⁄ects a concern with early poverty from the extent of its implied
concern with chronic poverty. Therefore we also use a weighting function based on the
quadratic function described earlier (i.e., ￿(t;T) = c0 ￿c1t￿c2(t￿1)2, c0;c1;c2 > 0,
and c0 = c1T + c2(T ￿ 1)2 + 1 to ensure ￿t > 0 for all t). In this case, by ￿xing
c1 and increasing c2 one can generate a new set of weights that is more sensitive to
early poverty and displays a higher degree of curvature. Fixing c2 and increasing c1
also creates a set of weights that is more sensitive to early poverty but (for c2 > 0)
creates a set of weights that display less curvature. The results for various values of
c1 and c2 are summarized in Tables 3 through 6 below.
When c1 = c2 = 0 the weighting function implies equal weights for each t; i.e.,
￿t = 1=T. Moving in the tables either by increasing c1 or c2, while holding the other
at zero, creates a set of weight that are decreasing in t. However, in the case of
increasing c1 the weight function is linear and so the lifetime poverty measure does
not become sensitive to chronic poverty, while it does in the case of increasing c2.
Increasing only c1 while holding c2 = 0 leads to a modest increase in lifetime poverty
for non-whites. On the other hand, increasing c2 while holding c1 = 0 leads to a
somewhat larger increase in the measure of lifetime poverty for nonwhites (3.4% vs.
1.0% when " = 1). There is even less of an e⁄ect when using " = 2 where we see
lifetime poverty for non-whites even falls marginally when increasing c1. The e⁄ect
of creating decreasing weights has roughly the same type of e⁄ect on the measure of
lifetime poverty for whites as was induced by changing the parameter ￿ for the other
weighting function.
In both cases of " = 1;2 we ￿nd that, having chosen a positive value for c2, moving
from c1 = 0 leads to a ￿clawing back￿of the e⁄ect on poverty from having increased
c2 for non-whites. Thus, when moving to a weighting function that is more sensitive
to early poverty, the impact on lifetime poverty measurement depends on whether
one does this using a function with a greater or lesser degree of curvature. In this
case, using a lesser degree of curvature reduces the implied increase in poverty. This
suggests that chronic poverty is also an important property of the lifetime income pro-
￿les for non-whites in terms of contributing to the measured cost of lifetime poverty.
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24Table 3: EDE poverty gap for whites




0 92.17 83.32 83.30
0.5 83.06 83.27 83.27
1 82.38 83.22 83.25
Table 4: EDE poverty gap for non-whites




0 437.27 441.66 441.67
0.5 451.01 442.00 441.84
1 452.03 442.32 442.01
Table 5: EDE poverty gap for whites




0 500.48 464.56 464.47
0.5 461.60 464.29 464.33
1 458.58 464.03 464.20
Table 6: EDE poverty gap for non-whites




0 1020.77 1018.89 1018.89
0.5 1031.98 1019.33 1019.11
1 1032.81 1019.74 1019.33
We now turn our attention to regional comparisons.26 Bishop, Formby, and Thistle
(1992, 1994) used cross-section data from the Census of Population and Housing
public-use tapes to compare regional income distributions for the years 1969 and
1979 (i.e., using the 1970 and 1980 survey years). Their goal was to establish the
extent to which regional income distributions and welfare had converged or diverged
over this period. Following their lead, we consider the cost of poverty for the same
regions over the longer time period of 1967 to 1992. Using PSID data allows us to
26Individuals are assigned to a region based on where they lived the majority of their lives.
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25incorporate a concern for the temporal pattern of lifetime poverty experiences (i.e.,
use of lifetime poverty measures) for these regions. Our main goal is not so much
as to establish convergence/divergence trends but rather to see how incorporating
a sensitivity for the temporal pattern of incomes may a⁄ect regional comparisons.
Will the cost of poverty over individuals lifetimes by region be closer or further apart
according to alternative assumptions about sensitivity to the temporal pattern of
poverty experiences in these regions? In particular, compared to equal weighting
of snapshot poverty experiences, we want to determine if an emphasis on early and
chronic poverty characteristics of individuals￿poverty experiences reduces or increases
the wedge in the cost of poverty between regions.
Twenty-six years of panel data of course does not represent the entire lifetime
experience of an individual. However, it is a longer span of time than most panel
data sets allow and certainly gives a potentially enhanced view of poverty than one
can obtain by comparing two years of snapshot poverty experiences. One interesting
￿nding of the analysis performed by Bishop, Formby, and Thistle (1992,1994) is that
the South￿ s income distribution either converged or moved signi￿cantly closer to the
income distribution of the rest of the country between 1969 and 1979. However,
over the same time interval the income distributions that make up the Non-South
were diverging from each other.27 We add to this analysis by comparing the poverty
experienced by individuals over the subinterval 1967-1979 to that of 1980-1992, each
subinterval being composed of 13 years. Although by splitting our data into two
subintervals we lose some of the advantage of taking a lifetime measurement approach,
this exercise allows for some interesting comparisons over two fairly long stretches of
time used to construct poverty measures with at least a dynamic, if not lifetime,
approach. Thus, we enhance the knowledge obtained through the cross-sectional
approach of Bishop, Formby, and Thistle (1992, 1994).
The table below indicates the percentage of individuals in each region and for
each time interval who have experienced at least one spell of poverty.
Table 7: Percentage experiencing at least one spell of poverty
West Northeast North Central South
1967-1992 29.8% 29.8% 34.4% 54.6%
1967-1979 21.4% 18.2% 25.5% 44.7%
1980-1992 21.4% 21.6% 27.6% 41.5%
Graphs illustrating the cumulative frequency curves for those who do experience at
least one spell of poverty within each region (and each time period considered) are
provided in the appendix (see Figures A2 to A4). It is clear that a greater fraction in
the South experience a greater number of spells of poverty than for any of the other
regions, while those in the West experience the least, regardless of what cuto⁄number
27Roughly speaking, our results are similar to their￿ s.
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26one considers. In fact, our measures of lifetime poverty measurement developed and
reported on below indicate the South as having the most and the West the least
amount of poverty in all comparisons. Over the entire interval (1967-1992), the
cumulative frequency curves of the Northeast and North Central intersect a number
of times and so no clear or unambiguous ranking would seem apparent on this basis.
However, the cumulative frequency curve for the Northeast is mostly above that for
the North Central region and the fraction experiencing at least one spell of poverty
is higher for the North Central region. Thus, it is not suprising that in all of our
lifetime poverty comparisons the Northeast has a lower cost of poverty than the
North Central.
There are some interesting di⁄erences between the two subintervals. The cumu-
lative frequency curve for the South seems somewhat ￿worse￿in the latter interval of
1980-1992 (i.e., mostly lower which suggests more people with many spells of poverty),
compared to the earlier interval of 1967-1979. However, the fraction of people who
experience no spells of poverty is higher in the later interval. Our lifetime poverty
measures suggest the second subinterval for the South has less lifetime poverty de-
spite the apparent potential for more chronic poverty. The cumulative frequency
curve for the West is mostly higher in the latter interval suggesting a lesser degree
of chronic poverty, while the percentage incurring any poverty is the same in both
subintervals. However, our lifetime poverty measures suggest the opposite conclusion
with poverty in the West higher in the latter subinterval.28 Finally, although roughly
speaking the cumulative frequency curve for the Northeast is higher than that for
the North Central region in both subintervals, the di⁄erence between the two curves
seems greater in the latter interval. Indeed, all of our measures of lifetime poverty
imply a bigger di⁄erence in the cost of poverty between the two regions (higher for
the North Central region) and this di⁄erence is greater in the latter subinterval. The
North Central also has higher average poverty rates in both subintervals.
We now turn to our formal measures of lifetime poverty. Due to the large number
of results we restrict our attention to a single application of the FGT parameter " = 1.
The implications of also considering " = 2 are very similar; that is, the overall pattern
of poverty comparisons is the same although the size of the cost of poverty is always
higher when " = 2 is used and the biggest relative di⁄erence is for those cases where
poverty as measured by the application of " = 1 is lower.29
We ￿nd that regardless of the weighting function and choice of parameter " for
the FGT measure30, and also which time period, the relative comparisons of life-
time poverty between regions remains the same. The cost of poverty for the time
28However, the increase in cost of poverty in the West for the second subinterval is relatively
small, with the greatest increase for the lifetime poverty measures occurring when weighting each
period equally. This last result indicates a higher average poverty gap in the second subinterval.
29The set of results for " = 2 is available upon request. We also use a ￿ner grid for the c1;c2
values and ￿nd no important e⁄ects upon doing so.
30Here we only report the results for " = 1. The qualitative nature of comparisons, however, is
the same for " = 2. These results are available upon request.
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27period 1967-1992 is always highest for the South, followed by the North Central,
Northeast, and ￿nally the West with the lowest cost of poverty. However, departing
from weighting each period equally, adopting a decreasing (and sometimes concave)
weighting function leads to interesting and di⁄erent implications for the di⁄erent
regions.
Consider ￿rst the weighting function ￿(t;T) = (1 ￿ t
T+1)￿. Recall, as we increase
￿ from zero (equal weighting of each time period) to ￿ = 1 we generate a lifetime
poverty measure that is increasingly more sensitive to early poverty, while at the
same time the degree of concavity of the measure (for 0 < ￿ < 1) falls. Results
for this weighting function are reported in tables 8 through 10 below. We see that
increasing the degree of sensitivity for early poverty when using the entire period
(1967-1992) leads to a lower measured cost of poverty compared to equal weighting
for the Northeast (8.0%), North Central (13%), and the West (7.4%) but leads to
a higher measured cost of poverty for the South (4%). Note that the number in
brackets in each case is the maximum possible e⁄ect resulting from choosing a value
of ￿ di⁄erent from zero and this maximal e⁄ect occurs for choice of ￿ = 1 in each
case.
There are a number of reasons for our decision to break the sample into two parts
of equal length. Firstly, panel data is often only available for relatively short lengths
of time, such as 5 to 10 years. Thus, if we ￿nd we obtain quite di⁄erent results
for our two time periods, this suggests a high degree of caution should be exercised
when treating results from such studies as indicative of lifetime poverty measures.
Also, from the cross-sectional studies mentioned above, we have reason to believe
that the extent of poverty in the regions has changed somewhat over our time period,
and especially for the South. We wish to see whether and, if so, how such changes
are realized in terms of ￿partial￿lifetime poverty measurement. Thirdly, although
in general we would ideally like to think of our time parameter t re￿ ecting more or
less an actual age of each individual (i.e., the person￿ s actual age), even with the
PSID data set it is not possible to create su¢ ciently large groups of separate cohorts
that we can trace over time. However, there is a sense in which breaking up the
period into two subintervals indirectly allows for an approximate comparison of the
two cohorts of families and their children of the two subintervals. So, for example,
if in the ￿rst subinterval (1967-79) early poverty is more of a concern than in the
second subinterval (1980-1992), then we can expect there was more child poverty for
children living in the relevant families in that earlier period. A case in point is the
South. By breaking up the time period we ￿nd that in the ￿rst subinterval (1967-79)
incorporating the early poverty concern through increasing ￿ from zero to one leads
to an increase in measured lifetime poverty of 12.2% while the e⁄ect is an increase of
only 4.9% in the second subinterval (1980-92).31
There are other interesting results arising from the subinterval analysis. For North
31Admittedly, given the mix of cohorts and family composition types in each subinterval, these
results are only suggestive.
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28Central, we had noted that taking account of early poverty concerns actually de-
creased the measure of lifetime poverty by up to 13%. However, in each of the two
subintervals this e⁄ect was not more than 2%. Thus, using either of the shorter
intervals of time leads to quite a di⁄erent conclusion on the e⁄ect of temporal consid-
erations on the measurement of lifetime poverty than one obtains by using the entire
period. It is also interesting to note the implications for the West. Using the entire
interval, the e⁄ect of increasing ￿ from zero to one leads to a reduction in lifetime
poverty of 7.4% while in the two subintervals the amounts are a 5.0% increase for
1967-79 and a decrease of 11.7% for 1980-92. Thus, to the extent that these re￿ ect
implications for two di⁄erent cohorts of (young) children in the two subintervals, this
points to the need to be careful in selecting time frames or making conclusions using
relatively short panels.
It is also interesting to note that the degree of sensitivity to timing of poverty
implied by a set of weights used in a lifetime poverty measure a⁄ects substantially
the size of the measured increase in ￿lifetime￿poverty in the West between the two
time periods. Using ￿ = 0 the implied increase in poverty in the West in the second
subinterval is 23.7% (64.94 to 80.92). Due to the importance of the temporal pattern,
however, if one adopts ￿ = 1, the increase is only 3.9% (68.20 to 70.87).
Tables 11 through 18 provide results from the same analysis as above except for
the weighting function ￿(t;T) = c0 ￿ c1t ￿ c2(t ￿ 1)2. The qualitative nature, and
even the quantitative nature, of the results are quite similar.
Table 8: EDE poverty gap for regions (1967-1992)
b g(￿;"); " = 1
￿ Northeast North Central South West
0 93.28 155.18 316.95 72.61
0.25 91.15 149.13 318.08 70.02
0.50 89.15 143.76 321.05 68.51
0.75 87.37 139.02 325.05 67.70
1 85.83 134.89 329.57 67.32
Table 9: EDE poverty gap for regions (1967-1979)
b g(￿;"); " = 1
￿ Northeast North Central South West
0 79.21 113.00 329.55 64.94
0.25 79.31 111.65 341.09 65.71
0.50 79.22 110.82 351.61 66.52
0.75 79.04 110.38 361.11 67.35
1 78.85 110.22 369.67 68.20
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29Table 10: EDE poverty gap for regions (1980-1992)
b g(￿;"); " = 1
￿ Northeast North Central South West
0 107.35 197.36 304.35 80.29
0.25 107.35 198.09 297.95 76.50
0.50 106.78 198.88 293.70 73.84
0.75 106.03 199.61 291.04 72.04
1 105.11 200.19 289.49 70.87
Table 11: Northeast EDE poverty gap (1967-1992)




0 93.28 87.24 87.23
0.5 86.35 87.18 87.20
1 85.83 87.13 87.17
Table 12: Northeast EDE poverty gap
b g(c1;c2;"); " = 1
c2
FIRST HALF (1967-1979) SECOND HALF (1980-1992)
c1 c1
0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1
0 79.21 78.80 78.80 107.35 107.49 107.49
0.5 78.90 78.80 78.80 105.39 107.33 107.41
1 78.85 78.80 78.80 105.11 107.18 107.33
Table 13: North Central EDE poverty gap (1967-1992)




0 155.18 139.20 139.16
0.5 136.29 139.03 139.08
1 134.89 138.86 138.99
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30Table 14: North Central EDE poverty gap
b g(c1;c2;"); " = 1
c2
FIRST HALF (1967-1979) SECOND HALF (1980-1992)
c1 c1
0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1
0 113.00 109.14 109.10 197.36 200.66 200.69
0.5 110.57 109.18 109.12 199.84 200.66 200.69
1 110.22 109.21 109.14 200.19 200.66 200.69
Table 15: South EDE poverty gap (1967-1992)




0 316.95 320.32 320.32
0.5 328.70 320.62 320.48
1 329.57 320.90 320.62
Table 16: South EDE poverty gap
b g(c1;c2;"); " = 1
c2
FIRST HALF (1967-1979) SECOND HALF (1980-1992)
c1 c1
0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1
0 329.55 361.67 362.01 304.35 286.80 286.61
0.5 364.66 362.53 362.45 291.34 286.81 286.62
1 369.67 363.30 362,86 289.49 286.82 286.64
Table 17: West EDE poverty gap (1967-1992)




0 72.61 66.52 66.50
0.5 67.69 66.53 66.51
1 67.32 66.54 66.51
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31Table 18: West EDE poverty gap
b g(c1;c2;"); " = 1
c2
FIRST HALF (1967-1979) SECOND HALF (1980-1992)
c1 c1
0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1
0 64.94 66.76 66.78 80.29 69.66 69.54
0.5 67.79 66.88 66.84 72.05 69.64 69.54
1 68.20 66.98 66.90 70.87 69.62 69.53
V. Some Remarks and Conclusion
In this paper we have used data from the PSID that provides information on
incomes of 1,494 individuals over 26 consecutive years in order to illustrate the impli-
cations of measuring poverty from a lifetime perspective. Our formulation of lifetime
poverty measurement recognizes that an individual￿ s lifetime poverty should be re-
￿ ected both by poverty experiences of each period (i.e., ￿snapshot￿ poverty) and
the poverty level of ￿permanent￿or retrospective lifetime consumption. By using a
weighted sum of the individual snapshot poverty experiences, we are able to re￿ ect
the sensitivity of how any poverty spells are distributed over a person￿ s lifetime on
lifetime poverty through the pattern of weights. In particular, we investigate the
implications of adopting an ￿early poverty axiom￿and a ￿chronic poverty axiom.￿
The early poverty axiom re￿ ects the well-established argument that poverty early in
life is more critical than poverty later in life while the chronic poverty axiom re￿ ects
the idea that, for example, two spells of poverty of a given intensity are more harmful
to an individual￿ s well-being the closer in time that these spells occur. This is a more
general view of chronic poverty than many others in the literature.
The property of early poverty sensitivity, if it holds globally over a person￿ s life-
time, means the weights must be nonincreasing over the time that an individual
lives, while sensitivity to chronic poverty means the weights must be concave in time.
In our empirical applications we have used speci￿c algebraic functions, ￿(t;T), to
generate appropriate weights (i.e., that are nonincreasing and satisfy the concavity
property as described by conditions of equation (7)). However, one may well wish to
select weights based on explicity empirical evidence of the impact of early versus late
poverty, including in particular childhood poverty, and the increased impact of spells
of poverty that occur close in time. One can also, of course, depart from our axioms.
In fact, the appropriate set of weights may depend on country-speci￿c matters such
as availability of age-related public goods and services. For example, suppose the
researcher has evidence suggesting that in a given context one should be especially
sensitive to poverty late in life due to fragility of the elderly. Thus, with continued
acceptance of the early poverty concern for (say) the childhood years, one might wish
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32to use weights ￿(t;T) that are U-shaped in t. One must recognize, however, that to
do so will mean the chronic poverty axiom cannot be satis￿ed.
In fact, in general we have demonstrated that one must recognize a potential
relationship or even con￿ ict between the concern of sensitivity to early/late timing of
poverty spells and a concern about chronic poverty. It would be possible, for example,
to have a set of weights that are decreasing in t for a set of consecutive periods early
in life (say t = 1;2;:::;T1) and increasing in t for a set of consecutive periods late in
life (say t = T2;T2 + 1;:::;T, with T2 ￿ T1). Further, one could impose concavity
on each of these two sets of weights in order to ensure that spreading out of poverty
spells that occur strictly within the ￿rst (early) set of periods or strictly within the
second (late) set of periods would lessen the impact of lifetime poverty; that is, allow
for the chronic poverty axiom to be re￿ ected within the early and late time periods.
However, in doing so one must recognize that the property of sensitivity to chronic
poverty could not be satis￿ed globally.32 In the current example this means that
spreading of a pair of spells of equivalent poverty, with one period from the early set
and the other from the late set, must lead to an increase in lifetime poverty. The
increased emphasis on the earlier and later poverty experiences form each set trumps
the possibility that relief from chronic poverty should imply less lifetime poverty.
Our approach explicitly recognizes such con￿ icts and, we believe, emphasizes the
need to consider such matters about the temporal pattern of poverty spells in the
conceptualization of lifetime poverty.
We have used the PSID data set and explored the power of orderings for pairwise
comparisons as implied by alternative combinations of properties that can be made
for any set of well-behaved snapshot poverty indices in conjunction with our axioms
on how the temporal pattern of poverty spells may in￿ uence lifetime poverty. Placing
no structure on how to compare poverty at di⁄erent periods of life leads to a very
weak general ordering principle. Adding the early poverty axiom and the chronic
poverty axiom sequentially markedly improves the power of the ordering procedure.
We also used speci￿c weighting functions and snapshot poverty indices (based on the
FGT measures) to illustrate how assumptions made about the temporal pattern of
poverty spells may a⁄ect lifetime poverty comparisons between groups. In particular,
we compared lifetime poverty measures for whites and non-whites as well as a set of
regional comparisons.
We found that within the set of weights that we chose, and in conjunction with the
FGT snapshot poverty gap index, the comparison of the EDE cost of poverty for non-
whites and whites implied a ratio of 4.74 (non-white:white) upon equal weighting of
poverty spells across time compared to 5.49 (see tables 3 and 4) with weights re￿ ecting
both a concern for early and/or chronic poverty. Our regional results contributed to
the literature on convergence and divergence of regional living standards from the
perspective of poverty experiences. We found that for all measurement assumptions,
32Mathematically, one cannot have a function that is ￿rst decreasing in t, later increasing in t,
yet has a negative second derivative thoughout.
35
33a clear poverty ranking persists whether one takes the entire time interval of our
available data (1967-1992) or split the data into two equal-length subintervals (1967-
1979 and 1980-1992). The South sustains the greatest cost of poverty, followed by
the North Central, Northeastern, and Western regions, respectively. However, upon
separate computations based on the time periods 1967-1979 and 1980-1992, the South
converged relative to all the other regions while the Northeast and North Central
regions diverged from each other and from the West. Our results demonstrate that
the extent to which this has occurred, as well as comparisons overall between regions,
depends on the assumed sensitivity to the temporal pattern of poverty spells used in
constructing lifetime poverty measures.
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Table A1: Poverty lines (in 1983 dollars) and implied equivalence scales








Implementation of Results for Pairwise Comparisons
Implementing the requirements for Results 1 and 2 (b, c) is straightforward, so
we only explain the cases for Results 4 (b,c) and 5 (b, c). In result 4 we consider
the implication of adopting the early poverty axiom that restricts the ￿(t;T)s to be
nonincreasing in time t. The implication for parts (b) and (c) is that rather than
checking for rank dominance and generalized Lorenz dominance, respectively, for the
complete vectors x and y, we must check this for all subvectors of length 1, 2, ..., T.
This is to ensure that poverty earlier in life is given prominence in making the ordering
as required by the early poverty axiom. To implement comparisons, let ‘ represent
the ￿rst ‘ years of a person￿ s life. Then the subvector e x‘ = (e x1;e x2;:::;e x‘) provides the
censored incomes of the ￿rst ‘ years, in chronological order. In line with our previous
notation, this vector when sorted in ascending order is e x‘ = (e x(1);e x(2);:::;e x(‘)). To
determine if income pro￿le x displays more lifetime poverty than income pro￿le y
under the early poverty axiom for all deprivation functions p such that p
0 < 0 one must
check if vector (e x1;e x2;:::;e x‘) rank dominates vector (e y1;e y2;:::;e y‘) for all ‘ = 1;:::;T.
This requires e x‘
(t) ￿ e y‘
(t) 8 t = 1;2;:::;‘ AND all ‘ = 1;2;:::;T: For the case of all
deprivation functions p such that p
0 < 0 and p
00 > 0, we require vector (e x1;e x2;:::;e x‘)
generalize Lorenz dominate vector (e y1;e y2;:::;e y‘) for all ‘ = 1;:::;T. This requires
checking
Pk
t=1 ~ x(t) ￿
Pk
t=1 ~ y(t) for k = 1;2;:::;‘ AND all ‘ = 1;2;:::;T. As in all
cases one must also check that minf￿ x;zg ￿ minf￿ y;zg.
In order to determine dominance conditions that allow for implementation of















+[1 ￿ ￿(T)]p(￿ x;z): (12)
and use Abel￿ s partial summation formula one more time (but in reserve order).
Now construct the following vectors xl, as de￿ned below, and then check for rank
40
38dominance (case b) and generalized Lorenz dominance (case c) based on the sorted
vectors xl (in nondescending order):
~ xl = (~ x1;::; ~ x1 | {z }
l times
;:::; ~ xT￿l+1;::; ~ xT￿l+1 | {z }
l times
; ~ xT￿l+2;::; ~ xT￿l+2 | {z }
l￿1 times





Thus, for l = 1 we get just the entire vector.
~ x1 = (e x1;e x2;:::;e xT)
For l = 2 we get:
~ x2 = ( ~ x1; ~ x1 | {z }
l=2 times
; ~ x2; ~ x2 | {z }
l=2 times
;::::; ~ xT￿1; ~ xT￿1 | {z }
l=2 times
; ~ xT |{z}
l￿1=1 times
)
For l = 3 we get:
~ xl = (~ x1; ~ x1; ~ x1 | {z }
l=3 times
; ~ x2; ~ x2; ~ x2 | {z }
l=3 times
;::::; ~ xT￿2; ~ xT￿2; ~ xT￿2 | {z }
l=3 times
; ~ xT￿1; ~ xT￿1 | {z }
l￿1=2 times




When the last step, l = T, is reached, e x1; appears T times, and then successive
elements appear T ￿ 1, T ￿ 2, ..., times, with e xT appearing once.
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39Figure A1: Cumulative frequency of number of poverty spells
Whites compared to non-whites
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40Figure A2: Cumulative frequency of number of poverty spells
Regional comparison for 1967-1992
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41Figure A3: Cumulative frequency of number of poverty spells
Regional comparison for 1967-1979
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42Figure A4: Cumulative frequency of number of poverty spells
Regional comparison for 1980-1992
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